In this paper 1 we discuss the security requirements for mediation, and present our approach towards satisfying them, with an emphasis on con dentiality and authenticity. Furthermore we outline the design of the basic security mechanisms for mediators. Our basic approach suitably combines the concepts of credentials, for authentic authorization with some kind of anonymity, and of asymmetric encryption, for con dentiality, and it can be extended to include additional mechanisms like digital signatures and ngerprints. Additionally it adopts the model of role based security policies because of its application orientation and of its potentials to integrate and unify various policies.
Introduction
Recent trends in information technologies led to vastly improved communication facilities like the Internet, an explosion of on-line multimedia information providers, and challenging new demands of users. Whenever a user looks for a piece of information, he may aim at identi ying promising sources, which can be quite heterogeneous and autonomous, and then retrieving and integrating the required data. And whatever data a source has to o er, it may aim at supporting a wide range of potential clients, which in general are unknown in advance. According to these trends, various forms of interoperable information systems have been developed. While federated database systems 16, 33, 22] have already come into existence, increasingly ambitious further demands have evolved and resulted in the paradigm of mediated information systems 39, 41] . Some current projects on mediation are TSIMMIS 37] MMM 4, 5] .
In mediated information systems a client, seeking for information, and various and autonomous sources, holding potentially useful data, are brought together by a third kind of independent components, called mediators. Mediation is required to deal with the heterogeneity and the autonomy of the sources, not only from the functional point of view but also with respect to all aspects of security. This includes con dentiality and authenticity, as well as integrity, anonymity, non-repudiation and availability.
Previous work on security of interoperable information systems has mainly been done for federated databases 19, 13, 9] , where the emphasis laid on resolving heterogeneity. According to the structure of federated databases, the security mechanisms were identity rather than credential based. There also appeared some contributions to security in mediated systems 7, 40, 18] .
The concept of credentials has been advocated by Chaum 10] for supporting privacy in networked systems. Since then it has been adopted for various purposes in interoperable systems, for electronic payment and marketplaces as well as for middleware systems like CORBA 26] . Further work includes 32, 6, 14] .
The model of role based security policies 30, 31, 20, 15] has been successfully used before, and in particular studied for integrating various policies.
2 Di ering requirements of federated and mediated systems While both federated database management systems and mediated information systems are used to integrate various autonomous information sources, several di erences between both approaches may be identi ed. Most interesting in the context of this paper are di erences related to and a ecting security issues of both approaches. We rst observe that many of the di erences result from di ering motivations of participants of federated and mediated environments, respectively.
Security issues in federated systems
In a federated system the federation establishment is stimulated by the members of the information source organization in order to support a closed group of client users. In many cases the client group is part of the organization which supports its interactions by means of the federation. Furthermore there exist dependencies between clients and information sources due to their identical organizational origin. The information sources of a federation act in a common interest anchored in the organization they belong to. This network of dependencies probably has had signicant impact on speci c security architectures as often found in federated systems.
As mentioned above, the information sources directly belong to a holding organization and therefore are trusted. Most federated systems do not authenticate information sources in a client-veri able way. The methods used to integrate information sources at the federation layer often involve administrative interaction, which takes place before client queries can be accepted. This suggests, that the set of information source layer members is rather static than dynamic. Under the assumption of a closed world the static nature of this approach leads to temporary loss of service when one or more information sources, which hold information relevant to the client query, are unavailable.
Opposed to information sources the federation clients are not trusted and require proper authentication and authorization. Because clients normally are members of the federation's organization, there is a closed group of registered users. New users are assigned prede ned roles but some systems also support anonymous client accesses.
Security issues in mediated systems
The motivation to integrate information sources using mediators is quite di erent. Clients demand systems enabling them to e ectively work with heterogeneous information sources. This demand stimulates information sources to supply their information on an ad-hoc basis, in particular for purchase. Information sources are likely to meet the client's requirements and to cooperate with mediators. Like in a marketplace of supply and demand there exist di erent motivations for cooperation in each layer. Generally clients, information sources and mediators are independent of each other. Information sources exist in competitive and non-competitive relationships with other information sources. Obviously there is no base for mutual trust between the three layers of a mediated system. While information sources probably will have cooperation contracts with mediators, it can be assumed that spontaneous clients are unknown beforehand. Clients thus cannot be registered in a static way before queries can be accepted. Even the group of information sources probably won't be as stable as found in federated systems due to the lack of organizational associations in mediated systems. Though one or more information sources may be temporarily unavailable a client query can be satis ed. There apparently is no useful assumption of a closed world in mediated systems due to their dynamics. Other new requirements relate to non-repudiation issues (e.g. origin, a rmative authorization) for traded items.
A case for mediated systems
We believe that mediated systems are more suitable to model dynamics and low trust of interacting parties. A mediator's top-down design paradigm allows for a stable presentation schema of integrated information at varying degrees of source uctuation, whereas a bottom-up approach requires a redesign of the global integration schema each time a local schema changes or is added. Mediators strive for tolerance with respect to information provider failures and o er service to adhoc clients which have not registered with the service beforehand. The latter forbids employment of merely identity based identi cation approaches as traditionally used in federated systems. This paper shows a possible approach to achieve secure mediation while considering our trust model and high dynamics in a certain mediation scenario as presented in the following sections.
Simple forwarding of security information
In the simple forwarding scenario security requirements and their ful llment travel back and forth between clients and information sources, while being forwarded completely unmodi ed and uncomplemented by the mediator. That is, all three layer participants can authenticate each other. When identities are authenticated, it is di cult to allow anonymous clients. On the other hand information sources know their clients and may use ne grained authentication, authorization and accountability. The sources inform clients about their security requirements via the mediator. In this scenario the mediator does not complement or modify these speci cations such that the clients are completely aware of each used source's security requirements. A client may pro t from a wealth of detail, but it is the client software's business to present a general view of a query's security requirements. Since in this scenario the mediator does not provide an integration layer for source policies, it is the client software's duty to do that. Consequently, the necessity to trust the mediator is limited to forwarding security information properly and privacy preserving.
Complete mediation of security information
A mediator which provides complete mediation of security information retrieves security requirements from information sources and integrates them. It presents the clients a coherent view of security requirements for a given query. This layer of abstraction conforms with the presentation of external objects. On the other hand an isolation of clients and sources is arti cially created. While this allows for anonymous clients, it has severe drawbacks on the granularity of authentication, authorization and accountability at the sources. Sources cannot destine query results for speci c clients and the latter cannot directly determine the origin of results. Obviously in this scenario clients as well as information sources need to trust the mediator.
A hybrid scenario
Our approach is based on a compromise of both of the above scenarios to get the best of both worlds. It is one of a mediator's design goals to integrate information and we seek to achieve integration for security information, too. On the other hand we think that it is necessary to provide information sources and clients with su cient information to establish a secure relationship via the mediator. Further it is a goal to protect the client's privacy and to minimize the necessary trust towards the mediator. In our hybrid scenario the mediator integrates source requirements and lets the clients choose, how much information to divulge about themselves. Only minimal necessary information about the clients then is sent to the sources. Subsequently, they can authenticate, authorize and audit the clients and appropriately protect results. The mediator cannot use results in a fraudulent way but is still able to integrate results of di erent sources. 4 Design of secure mediation
Fundamental requirements of secure querying
The following security requirements for querying are considered:
Any source wishes or is even legally obliged to autonomously follow a security policy with respect to con dentiality which ensures that requested information is delivered to appropriate clients only. In order to achieve this goal, clients have to provide evidence that they are eligible for requested information, and sources have to maintain mechanisms to inspect such evidence and to decide whether and which information is returned. Furthermore, a source has to ensure that information is actually delivered to only that client which provided the inspected evidence. The policy with respect to con dentiality as stated above should be at least compatible with additional viewpoints concerning authenticity, anonymity, integrity and availability. Any client wishes that shown evidences cannot be misused.
Surely, these fundamental requirements should be met for the simple case that a client directly addresses a source, as well as when both the client s request and the source s delivery are mediated.
Basic informational environment
We assume that there are trusted third parties (TTPs), trusted by all participants of a transaction, that o er at least the following services:
A TTP signs a certi cate of the rough form <identity(address), public (encryption) key, public (veri cation) key>, thereby assuring that the participant speci ed by the rst component is the owner of the keys. A TTP signs a credential of the rough form <attribute, public (encryption) key, public (verication) key>, thereby assuring the attribute speci ed by the rst component is enjoyed by the owner of the matching secret keys for decryption and signing.
Our basic protocols employ attributes contained in credentials, when shown to a source, as evidence that the owner of the matching secret keys might be eligible for some requested information. That is, a source decides on the basis of the presented attributes, whether and which information is returned. It is important to observe, that the source does not care how it has got knowledge of the credentials, whether directly from the owner of the matching secret decryption key or otherwise.
For the basic protocols we always only need the public key for encryption in credentials, as sketched in the following. Suppose that a participant wants to ensure that some returned data contain meaningful information only for the supposed owner of the matching secret decryption key. Then the participant takes care that the delivered data is the ciphertext of the plaintext which contains the information under consideration, where the encryption is done with the public key. The other keys are merely provided as a precaution for more advanced protocols.
Secure direct querying
Given this basic informational environment, we can specify the basic protocols. We distinguish a preparatory phase and a query phase.
In the preparatory phase, clients and sources do not yet interact. A client, wishing to request information later on, assembles credentials with his attributes supposed to provide evidence of his eligibility.
And a source, entitled to answer queries later on, de nes a security policy with respect to con dentiality which relates sets of attributes to the amounts of information allowed for delivery. More precisely a security policy is abstracted to be speci ed in the following form:
As input, the policy accepts some set of credentials belonging to a unique owner. For instance, this is the case if all occuring public keys are the same. It is important to observe that it is not necessary for the source to know the identity of that owner.
Only based on the set of attributes shown by the credentials, the policy states which kind of information is allowed to be delivered to the owner.
The protocol for the query phase is outlined as follows.
Protocol for secure query answering:
1. The client sends a request (identity(address), query, set of credentials) to the source. 2. The source veri es each credential, checks whether the set of credentials is acceptable, i.e. belong to a unique owner, and determines the associated set of attributes. 3. The source evaluates the query under the restriction that only such information is generated that, on the basis of the associated set of attributes, is allowed to be delivered. 4. The result of the restricted query evaluation is considered as plaintext and encrypted with (some of) the public key(s) occuring in the shown credentials. 5. The resulting ciphertext is sent back to the client. This protocol satis es the fundamental security requirements, as stated in Section 4.1:
Clients and sources exclusively have to trust the TTPs that signed credentials. Sources are supposed to have an interest in checking eligibility. Thus, for instance, data subjects, the data of which is stored in a source, have to trust the source with respect to checking eligibility appropriately. Eligibility is supposed to be de nable in terms of attributes. Since attributes are shown in the form of credentials that do not contain a eld for the identity of the owner, a client can stay anonymous as far as the source cannot infer the identity from its knowledge about the attributes and the connection data. Even in an untrusted network, only the unique owner of the veri ed credentials can recover the plaintext and thus gain the requested information. If any participant misused somebody else's credentials, the correct owner could be erroneously or maliciously blamed for the request. However, in a dispute about the sender of the request nobody can exhibit any essential evidence pro or contra the blame. If there is an interest in documenting the sender of a request, the protocol must be extended by appropriately signing the request.
Further concerns about authenticity or requirements on integrity could be dealt with by additional actions that are based on appropriate signing. These actions would be founded on the certi cates o ered by the basic informational environment. In particular, if a source is concerned about a client redistributing received data without the source s approval, the source can ngerprint (see Section 5) the delivered copies of the data. There are no speci c provisions or additional obstacles to availability.
Secure mediation
We now extend the approach presented in Section 4.3 for the case of mediation. To begin with, we ignore security requirements for the moment and just state a rough abstract protocol for mediated query answering, see also Now taking care of the fundamental security requirements we can easily combine the basic protocols for secure query answering with the protocol for mediation. In the straightforward case the protocols for the preparatory phase remain unchanged. And the mediation protocol is modi ed by integrating the basic protocol for the query phase as follows. In step a) the client includes a set of credentials into the request for query q. In step c) the mediator just forwards the received set of credentials to each of the relevant sources. In step d) each relevant source performs the security actions of step 2) of the basic protocol, and query evaluation is restricted as stated in step 3) of the basic protocol. Finally, in step e), each relevant source rst encrypts its local answer according to step 4) of the basic protocol before sending it back to the mediator. It can be checked that the fundamental security requirements are invariantly satis ed as for the simple case. There are only some minor restrictions. We note two aspects. Now another participant, the mediator, acquires knowledge about the client s credentials and thus could give raise to false blames about the sender of a request. But this possibility does not introduce a substantially new problem. And a mediator may compromise the integrity of data, if no additional actions are taken. There is also an improvement with respect to a client s wish to stay anonymous with respect to a source, since in general there is no need for a direct connection between the client and a source.
However, there are important observations dealt with in section 4.5:
The functional requirements on the mediator may be seriously a ected if in the integration step f) the expected operations for integrating local answers can not be performed on the ciphertexts.
Step b) can be greatly improved by facilities of the mediator to assist a client in the management of credentials.
Advanced secure mediation 4.5.1 Layered mediation
So far we treated the case that there is only one layer of mediation. However, we have argued that mediation does not essentially a ect the fundamental security properties of direct querying, and thus we could use our approach also for mediation across several layers.
Referencing and using public encryption keys
In Section 4.2 we simply assumed credentials to contain the public encryption key of the attribute s owner. And in Section 4.3 we showed a straightforward way how a source can employ such an encryption key. These features allow some useful variations. Firstly, there is no essential need for including the public encryption key in the credential. In place of the key itself it is su cient to equip the credential with information on how to retrieve the key of the attribute's unique owner. And secondly, con dentiality of delivered information can also be ensured as follows: The source encrypts the answer with any session key using any encryption method, and it encrypts only the session key with the public key. Then both the ciphertext and the encrypted session key are returned to the client.
Mediated management of credentials
In Section 4.4 we presented a modi ed mediation protocol, in which the mediator during step c) just forwards the received set of credentials to each of the relevant sources. There is room for a lot of important improvements which, basically, assist a client in managing his credentials. The most important issues to be addressed are:
A client may wish to present a minimal set of credentials to each of the relevant sources. He may also require that, if there is any choice to answer his global query, the mediator should decompose the query in such a way that subqueries are sent to sources with minimal credential requirements.
More generally, a client would like to be assisted in revealing as few of its attributes as possible. On the other hand, a client may specify a wanted level of quality with respect to the global answer to his query. This goal requires that the mediator takes best advantage of all available credentials. More generally, a client would like to be assisted to achieve a maximal level qualitity of the answer. Obviously, in general there will be a tradeo between minimizing the use of credentials and maximizing the quality of information. Accordingly, a client would like to be assisted in balancing the con icting goals. Even more generally, a client would like to negotiate with the mediator which set of credentials he is willing to submit. Additionally, due to heterogeneity, the formats of the credentials currently at the client's disposal may not be accepted by some of the possible sources. In this case, the client would like to be assisted in getting reformatted credentials from some of the TTPs. For these and similar tasks, the mediator has to be able to resolve all kinds of heterogeneity among the security policies of the sources. Thus the characteristic services of mediators with respect to pure query answering should be extended to dealing with security policies as well. Moreover, the mediator, having its own mediator schema and its own local data and possibly also materialized data from previous queries, could have its own mediator security policy. Surely, such a mediator security policy must be suitable to integrate appropriate views on the various security policies of the sources. For this purpose, the mediator security policy should be considered as part of an extended mediator schema, and accordingly it should be declared during the preparatory phase. Furthermore, whenever a source is contracted to participate in the mediated information system, an appropriate security wrapper has to be constructed from the given mediator policy and the source policy.
Apparently all these and other related issues could be treated in many di erent ways. We argue that exploiting features of object orientation and of role based evaluation control are most promising. Object orientation is used for a uni ed view of all parts of the information system, and for providing appropriate granularities of controlled units. Role based control is selected for being application oriented and for its potential to integrate and unify various policies. Finally evaluation control is meant to combine aspects of access control, to be exercised mainly when invoking an operation, and of information ow control, to be exercised mainly when returning the result of a (nearly) completed operation. In this paper we do not propose a speci c object oriented role based evaluation control model. Rather in the next Section 4.5.4 we merely outline the avour of such a model.
Role based evaluation control by the mediator
We intend to use a uni ed model of query evaluation and role based security enforcement. Such a model should be suitable to re ne step 3) of the basic protocol for secure query answering. As a starting point we abstract query evaluation as being performed in three phases:
The query (expression) q is associated with some kind of search space, called access(q), that depends on the current state of the information system. Each element of the search space has the form oid:meth, where oid is some valid object identi er and meth is a method (identi er). All oid:meth 2 access(q) are actually executed.
In the following, each result is denoted as (oid:meth; exec(oid:meth)).
The set of all returned results is further assembled and aggregated into the nal answer. For this purpose the query (expression) q is associated with some set oriented data manipulation function, called mapping(q).
Taking together, the three phases result in computing the answer mapping(q)( f(oid:meth; exec(oid:meth))j oid:meth 2 access(q)g ):
Now we are ready to de ne our abstraction of roles.
A role r is given as (attr r ; q r ), where attr r is a set of attributes as they can appear in credentials, and q r is a query. Again the query q r is associated with a "search space" access(q r ) and a "manipulation function" mapping(q r ). But now access(q r ) is interpreted as the maximal scope of searching, for the sake of access control. And mapping(q r ) is interpreted as a lter, for the sake of information ow control. More precisely, the restricted answer to a client's query q C is computed as mapping(q C ) mapping(q r ) ( f(oid:meth; exec(oid:meth))j oid:meth 2 access(q C ) \ access(q r )g ):
We can now sketch how the mediator addresses the issues of credential management within the model outlined so far. Fundamental for all issues is that the mediator maintains its own mediator security policy in accordance to the model, and that for any contracted source some kind of "export security policy" is derived and given as input for its security wrapper. Furthermore, addressing these issues would be greatly facilitated, if the mediator can store proxy objects representing a reference to the corresponding external source object. In that case, the mediator can attach to a proxy object the information whether a method invocation meth on the represented external object in a source, where oid is the external identi er, is allowed by some role r, i.e. whether oid:meth 2 access(q r ).
Based on such kind of information the mediator can attempt to decide many of the mediation problems mentioned in Section 4.5.3 locally in advance. It should be noted that some of these problems are closely related to the task of query optimization. The common theme is to analyze the query expression and easily available additional knowledge in order to determine which fraction of a potentially very large search space has to actually be inspected in order to determine the query answer.
Integration of local answers -functionality versus con dentiality
As already observed in Section 4.4, during the delivery phase of the protocol for mediated and secure query answering we are faced with the problem that the following requirements may be con icting:
The mediator has to integrate and possibly materialize the local answers, sent back to the mediator by the sources to be nally delivered to the client. The mediator should not be able to break the security policies of the sources. In particular, ideally the mediator should not gain meaningful information from the partial answers. We discuss several solutions to this problem. They vary in two parameters: the achieved functionality for integration and the required trust in the mediator necessary to keep partial answers con dential. speci cation as given in Section 4.4. Here the mediator operates on the ciphertexts only, and thus no trust in the mediator is necessary.
Without any provisions, the achieved functionality for integration will be rather low. Essentially, the mediator can only annotate and forward the local answers.
The functionality for integration can be improved if the mediator causes all sources to uniformly use a privacy homomorphism 29, 38] for encrypting their local answers. Such a privacy homomorphism allows a subset of typical database manipulations on ciphertexts to be carried out as if they were executed on plaintexts.
In order to employ a privacy homomorphism the mediator instructs all relevant sources to use an appropriate encryption method and the same session key. As discussed in Section 4.5.2 there are no essential limitations in doing so. Of course, in this situation the encryption method should be asymmetric because otherwise we could not guarantee con dentiality among the sources.
Optimistic solutions: These solutions allow the mediator to observe the local answers as plaintexts. Then the mediator can operate on local answers without any restrictions, but sources and clients have to put their trust on the mediator, at least to some extent.
Surely, once the mediator has observed plaintext answers, the sources cannot technically enforce correct usage of the information gained. The best they can achieve is to bind the mediator to xed obligations. Later on they can try to somehow supervise the behaviour of the mediator, and to blame the mediator for detected misuse. The following modi cation of the deliverable phase is suitable for this purpose.
In step e) of the protocol, before sending local answers back to the mediator, the source performs the following actions:
It ngerprints the copy of the data to be delivered such that later on that copy can be identi ed as devoted to the speci c mediator.
It attaches binding approvals to the data. An approval of form < distribute; oid; S; M; C > roughly states that "source S allows mediator M to distribute the content of (the object identi ed by) oid to client C" , and it is digitally signed by the source.
It encrypts the data using a public encryption key of the mediator.
In forthcoming disputes, the source can use the ngerprints to prove that the mediator has been delivered the data, and the mediator can use the approvals to prove that it has been allowed to further distribute the data.
However, not all possible problems are solved. Whenever later on the source claims that some further participant illegally holds a copy of the delivered data, then that copy may originate either from the mediator or the client who has issued the global query. The last case is also a problem without mediation. The new problem of mediation is to discriminate between misbehaviour of the client and misbehaviour of the mediator.
At the expense of additional security overhead all problems could be resolved with the same techniques sketched above, namely ngerprinting and approvals, now speci c for the client (instead of speci c for the mediator).
Materialization of local answers
Once the mediator has got local answers from the sources, it could materialize that data in order to reuse it for further queries. Obviously, on the one side materialization raises new variants of the old problems concerning functionality, con dentiality, trust and claim of origin. But on the other side it could increase the overall e ciency of the mediator. A full treatment of all details of the interdependence of efciency and security in the context of materialization is beyond the scope of this paper and will be treated elsewhere.
Further topics for multimedia extensions
The acceptance of new multimedia communication services depends on whether suitable techniques for the protection of the multimedia providers' interests are available. In the following we would like to mention some multimedia speci c security requirements and mechanisms.
Encryption of multimedia data: Multimedia applications need fast encryption mechanisms, handling up to tens and even hundreds of Mbit/s. The symmetric stream ciphers seem to be the most suitable option, and nowadays still hardware implementations are necessary 12].
Normally, data compression must be performed before encryption, which itself must be performed before channel coding. This is not true in some applications for digital TV Image compression and encryption: An image compression algorithm can be modi ed such that its output can be decomposed into several parts 11]. The encryption process classi es each part into two types: the crucial parts and the remaining parts. The crucial parts contain the signi cant information about the original image. The remaining parts yield negligible information if the crucial parts are unknown. Only the crucial parts need to be encrypted. The remaining parts are left unencrypted and can be sent on demand. The concepts discussed in 11] can also be adopted to mediator-based information system environments.
Claim of origin: A limiting factor in using multimedia communication services is that providers of multimedia data are reluctant to allow the distribution of their documents in a networked environment because of electronic piracy.
Robust digital watermarking 1] and ngerprinting 27] represent su cent deterrences, since they enable identi cation of source, owner, distributor or authorized consumer of digitized images, audio and video recordings. A digital watermark or a ngerprint is an identi cation code, permanently and imperceptibly embedded into digital data, carrying information pertaining to copyright protection and data authentication. A copyright protection code can contain a copyright noti cation, a unique serial number, a creator identi er, a distributor identi er, as well as other data attributes.
Conclusion
This paper has presented the avour of a secure mediation environment. We addressed the di erent security requirements stemming from di erent motivations of participants in both federated and mediated environments. Within the secure mediation environment outlined in our work, clients seeking information and autonomous sources holding data can communicate with each other via mediators while complying with their security requirements. We mainly have focussed on the security requirements concerning condentiality and authenticity. Our approach makes a speci c contribution towards secure interoperation by combining the credential based authentic authorization with some kind of anonymity and of asymmetric encryption for con dentiality. As an extension to our approach we have discussed the usability of digital signatures and ngerprints to meet the security requirements with respect to integrity and accountability. We have also presented the concepts for query evaluation control utilizing role based security enforcement. We then have highlighted some multimedia speci c security requirements and mechanisms. Figure 2 illustrates the security requirements between the participants. There are a number of promising areas for future work. First, there is a need for the mechanisms presented to be applied to emerging applications having diverse security requirements. Such research could reveal new kinds of security problems. For this reason we began to realise some of our concepts in a software prototype which is to be implemented in a student project.
Another area for further research is to investigate the tradeo between e ciency and security in the context of materialization. This also is a promising research area for data warehousing applications. Typically, warehouses contain static collections of materialized views of multiple data sources with di ering security policies.
Since our Multimedia Mediator (MMM) 4, 5] bases on CORBA, there is a need to explore the applicability of our approaches in the CORBA communication environment.
A nal area of research would be to re ne and formalize the model of role based query evaluation.
